

## ***News From The Front !***



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### **DISCLAIMER**

This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein have not been staffed, but are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.

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# SOMALI MINE THREAT

*by William C. Schneck, Countermine Systems Directorate, Ft Belvoir, VA*

Mine incidents were one of the primary causes of U. S. casualties in Somalia, accounting for 26 percent of the Americans killed in action during Operation RESTORE HOPE (ORH). Each of these casualties undercut popular support for the operation and rekindled debate in the press.

Although the mines present in Somalia were comparatively "low tech" considering what is available on the world market, U. S. countermine capabilities are still inadequate. Fielded countermine technology has changed little since Vietnam and World War II. For this reason, low tech mines still represented a significant threat to U. S. forces involved in ORH as they have in prior conflicts.

## U.S. Mine Casualty Trends

Conflict	Personnel	Vehicles
WW II (Italy)	4.4%	33%
Korea	10%	56%
Vietnam	33%	70%
Persian Gulf	20%	NA
Somalia	26%	NA

The increasing reliance by irregular forces on mines threatens to neutralize our advantages in firepower and mobility by limiting our ability to react. These attacks will most likely be directed against our vulnerable supply lines where we are least able to counter them. More than 2,500 mine and fuze combinations are in use today. As a result of this proliferation, mines have become a "condition of the battlefield" and threaten not just combat engineers, but all soldiers, including CSS personnel. Neglect of countermine training for all soldiers significantly decreases the ability of the U. S. Army to support national policy and causes unnecessary casualties.

Refer to the Common Task Manual and FMs 20-32, **Mine Countermine Operations**, and 90-13-1, **Combined Arms Breaching Operations**, for detailed information.

# **Logistics in Peace Keeping Operations**

*by CPT John Hort, Combat Maneuver Analyst, CALL*

U. S. units that deploy on a UN peacekeeping mission need to become completely familiar with the UN logistical supply system. Specifically, commanders should expect lengthy delays when ordering and receiving materiel and services.

The UN operates a manual, fairly simplistic supply system; however, units that do not understand this system prior to deployment can initially encounter logistical shortfalls that adversely impact on the operation.

## **Classes of Supply**

Units deployed under the control of a UN chain of command discover very early in the mission that logistical support is very limited in most classes of supply. For example, Class IX repair parts for U. S. vehicles and equipment must be coordinated and supplied through home-station support. Remotely located UN operations require the commander to effectively plan for sustainment operations that include air, rail, sea, and ground resupply.

## **Contracting**

Local contracting becomes critical during most UN peacekeeping operations. Units should identify and train a local contract officer and ordering Class A agent prior to deployment. Remote UN operations may also demand the need for comptroller certification. Comptroller-certified units alleviate the time delays between the division comptroller and the forward deployed unit.

## **Long-Range Forecasting**

U. S. peacekeeping units should forecast long-range supply needs and order supplies in anticipation of needs rather than in response to needs. Rotating peacekeeping missions must also consider the requirements of deploying future units. Commencing and then halting the UN support infrastructure during and after a unit rotation will only add to the delays attributed to the system.

## **Predeployment Training**

Historically, MTTs from outgoing peacekeeping units have trained incoming soldiers and leaders on peace operations. Most MTT training is centered on peacekeeping at the platoon and squad levels. Frequently, logistics familiarization and training have not received priority or emphasis. Incoming S4s and supply personnel are normally not trained on UN supply procedures nor on the amount of paperwork and channels established under the system. The UN has a general supply book that contains all supplies the UN offers. The S4 and unit logistics personnel use this book when ordering UN materiel.

# **The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Leaders' Training Program (LTP)**

*by CPT Marcus DeOliveira, JRTC*

The Leaders' Training Program (LTP) at the JRTC offers a unique training experience for light infantry, airborne, and air assault brigade and battalion commanders and their battle staffs. LTP provides an opportunity for these commanders and battle staffs to improve battle command and warfighting skills before their JRTC field rotation.

An LTP rotation typically occurs 90 days before a unit rotation during the prebattle period - a time when the battle staffs and attachments (e.g., civil affairs, mechanized or armor team, psychological operations, and special operations) are locked in. The timing of the LTP rotation permits brigade and battalion commanders the opportunity to focus on battle command and battle staff training and impart warfighting guidance before the unit rotation. At the same time, the staffs work with each other in a warfighting environment. The unit will typically conduct two planning exercises, both of which receive continual AAR feedback. One plan is then executed on a JANUS simulation to exercise the tactical decisionmaking process, IPB, battle drills, TOC procedures, and battle tracking.

The six-day program is based on a schedule of core seminars, exercises and electives. LTP will program special electives if the unit requests them at least 30 days before the LTP rotation. The objective is to tailor a schedule to the unit's warfighting needs.

The key components of LTP are the teaching, coaching and mentoring conducted by JRTC Observer/Controllers (OC) and LTP coaches. These coaches, retired former battalion and brigade commanders, offer many years of experience in command and staff. Because of their close relationship with OC teams and personal observation of units in the field, coaches are able to provide timely lessons from the "box." They are also current in doctrine and operational issues.

The LTP rotation remains an inexpensive training program with a high payoff. FORSCOM, through JRTC, provides funding sufficient to transport commanders and staffs to and from Ft Polk. Billeting and meals are provided for all attendees. The LTP is located in north Ft Polk, free from distractions.

For further information on the LTP, contact LTC Kinnison, Chief, LTP, and CPT DeOliveira, Deputy, LTP, DSN 863-5146/5141, FAX, 5169.

# **HAITI (Operations Uphold Democracy)**

*by LTC Lou Sperl, Chief, CALL Collection Team (Haiti)*

On 19 September 1994, U. S. Army forces conducted a permissive entry onto the Port-au-Prince International Airport to initiate Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The operation validated the readiness and training methods applied at the various collective training centers.

There were many "firsts" associated with this operation, such as employing a Navy aircraft carrier as an Army force projection platform and positioning command and control aboard a Naval vessel. In addition, the increased emphasis on joint professional military education and participation in joint training exercises supported the overall accomplishment and execution of the operation. Several key areas from the operation are listed here.

- Training units for war produced units fully capable of conducting operations other than war (OOTW). The operation demonstrated that units that conduct hard, realistic training for war produce the disciplined soldiers who will have the versatility to conduct OOTW.

- The presence of overwhelming combat power intimidated potential hostile forces into avoiding confrontation. Even though operations were conducted in a permissive environment, units ensured that plans were arranged so the operation could rapidly go "hot." The presence of highly disciplined troops supported by light tanks, attack helicopters, and C-130 gunships dissuaded unfriendly elements from confrontation.

- Planning for initial operations in Haiti was marked by the compartmentalizing of information. Striking a balance between the need to limit information and the risk of compromise associated with too many planners being aware is a critical decision for commanders. Part of the decisionmaking process should consider the adverse affect compartmentalizing may have on synchronization.

- Both the Corps and the Division headquarters were transitioned to a Joint Task Force (JTF) structure. Using an existing headquarters to form the core elements of a JTF staff has advantages. The newly formed JTF headquarters can rely on the existing staff processes of the core unit. Many members of the joint staff will also have established working relationships.

- The operation was military police intensive. Because of the sensitive nature of operations in Haiti, MPs were often given static security missions to take advantage of their expertise in dealing with civilians and their training on restraint in the use of force. MP employment must be balanced with the doctrinal tenet that MPs are best used in a manner that maximizes their mobility.

■ Logistics units made great use of liaison teams to facilitate resupply efforts. LO teams were sent to the departure ports and supporting depots to coordinate resupply. Units sent senior officers and NCOs and ensured they had communications capabilities as well as an understanding of the commander's intent for sustainment.

■ A secure communications gateway was established during the operation. This was the first operation in which this gateway was successfully activated. The net effect was the ability of the JTFs and joint agencies worldwide to operate on an information highway capable of transmitting up to SECRET level.

■ Civil Affairs (CA) units conducted a wide range of missions in support of operations. CA units were integrated into the overall scheme of maneuver. CA units actively coordinated and were supported by the PSYOP effort and were able to achieve an even greater impact with their programs. Multi-functional CA teams were organized to more efficiently assess large urban area and small villages in remote parts of the country.

■ Military intelligence units and staffs developed procedures to support the commander's decisionmaking process. They applied the IPB process to develop decision aides, targeting methodology, and graphics that specifically addressed the relevant METT-T factors in the operation. However, a light division does not have the required intelligence system architecture to efficiently support a joint task force headquarters. The ability to achieve joint interface in automated intelligence systems requires the augmentation of the division by a Corps-level MI brigade.

■ Operations in Haiti demonstrated that engineers need to be represented as a separate staff entity in JTF headquarters. Joint doctrine emphasizes the role of engineers in construction and facilities management, usually under the staff supervision of the J4. This approach appears to be more applicable at the strategic level. The engineer tasks of mobility and survivability must still be addressed at the operational and tactical levels of war and OOTW.

■ The JTF Chaplain is the integrator of the commander's religious support plan. Therefore, the JTF chaplain must develop a plan for full religious coverage throughout the JTF. The JTF chaplain should have the authority to extend technical supervision over all chaplaincy assets assigned to the JTF to make this possible. The channels the chaplain uses to plan and execute this responsibility must be extended to include sister service, multi-national, and local national assets.